Sabotage in Tournaments: Evidence from a Natural Experiment * Many tournaments are plagued by sabotage among competitors. Typically, sabotage is welfare-reducing, but from an individual's perspective an attractive alternative to exerting positive effort. Yet, given its illegal and often immoral nature, sabotage is typically hidden, making it difficult to assess its extent and its victims. Therefore, we use data from Judo World Championships, where a rule change in 2009 basically constituted a natural experiment that introduced one costless opportunity for sabotage. In Judo, competitors can break an opponent's attack in an unsportsmanlike manner; these are seen as acts of sabotage. Based on a unique dataset of 1,422 fights, we find that the rule change in 2009 has led to a large increase in the use of sabotage. Moreover, sabotage is more likely to be employed by relatively less qualified individuals, and to be targeted at more qualified ones. From a survey among spectators, we show that sabotage is welfare-reducing. (Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2005 Falk et al., 2008) and that sabotage has disincentive effects on tournament participants (Carpenter et al., 2011 The use of data from Judo competitions has a number of advantages for the study of sabotage in tournaments. First, the rules are such that one can distinguish between "productive activities" aimed at winning the fight through a positive technical score, in the best case an
Introduction
Tournaments such as races for job promotions, political office, or sports competitions are often plagued by sabotage among competitors. Instead of exerting positive effort to win the tournament, competitors may alternatively resort to sabotage, for instance through spreading malicious rumors about competitors, withholding important information, or by destroying a competitor's output. Sabotage is therefore typically welfare damaging, either in a direct way by reducing output or performance of competitors or indirectly if it reduces the agents' incentives to exert productive effort (Konrad, 2000; Carpenter et al., 2010; . While it seems obvious that sabotage is costly for organizations, it is due to its very nature hard to observe. Since sabotage is typically associated with illegal -or immoral -and punishable activities, those who engage in it will try to hide their activities. Therefore, it is hardly possible to collect clean, disaggregated data on sabotage at the individual level from organizations. Using the words of Charness and Levine (2004, p. 1) , "because sabotage breaks rules it is difficult to study in the field".
So far, two prominent approaches have been used in the literature to examine sabotage empirically. The first one is to resort to controlled laboratory evidence, where sabotage can be observed by the experimenters. Several experiments have found that sabotage increases with the prize spread in a tournament (Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2005 Falk et al., 2008) and that sabotage has disincentive effects on tournament participants (Carpenter et al., 2011) . Interestingly, Charness et al. (2011) have shown that sabotage can even occur in the absence of material incentives as a result of status-seeking behavior. The second approach is to use data from sports tournaments, where behavior is observable and well recorded. For instance, Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2005) and del Corral et al. (2010) have studied how an increase in the points awarded for victory in soccer tournaments has affected the incidence of fouls, yellow cards (booking) and red cards (immediate dismissal) and the number of defensive players in a team. Their main finding has been that stronger incentives have increased the defensive play of teams and the incidence of fouls and thus yellow and red cards.
In this paper we also use data from a sports tournament, in particular from Judo World Championships, in order to examine the response of sabotage to changes in its cost structure, as well as its relationship with a number of personal characteristics such as (relative) ability and gender. To our knowledge, this is the first paper presenting field evidence on the interplay between the cost and the extent of sabotage. While previous experimental and field studies from soccer have examined how the prize for winning a contest affects sabotage activities, the cost side of sabotage has not received attention yet. From a legal perspective, however, it seems straightforward that jurisdictions are primarily concerned with how to determine penalties for sabotage and less so with intervening in the prize spread between winner and loser prizes in competitions. Likewise, organizations can easily adapt internal rules of conduct to change the expected cost of sabotage, for instance by monitoring more closely employees' activities or by threatening certain types of behavior with dismissal.
The use of data from Judo competitions has a number of advantages for the study of sabotage in tournaments. First, the rules are such that one can distinguish between "productive activities" aimed at winning the fight through a positive technical score, in the best case an
Ippon (the equivalent of a knock-out in boxing), and "destructive activities" intended to hinder the opponent's attack, which are penalized (called shido) if they are judged to be against the rules of the game. We will treat such "destructive activities" as a form of sabotage.
Second, a change in the rules, effective since 2009, has provided fighters with an opportunity for one costless act of sabotage. Comparing data before and after the rule change allows studying the impact of a different cost structure on the use of sabotage in what is in effect a natural experiment (List and Reiley, 2008 Finally, the lowest score (Koka) is given when one contestant with control throws the other onto one shoulder, his thigh(s), or buttocks, or by Osaekomi-waza for 10 to 14 seconds.
The scores are lexicographic, so that -unless a fight has already been decided by an
Ippon or two Waza-ari -the winner is the fighter with the score of higher rank at the end of the fight. In other words, no matter how many Yuko, respectively Koka, one collects, their score will be inferior to one Waza-ari, respectively one Yuko.
In addition to these positive scores, penalties are given to fighters who breach the rules of contest. There are two types of penalties, called shido and Hansoku-make. For a slight infringement, a contestant receives a penalty of shido, which is automatically converted into a positive score in favor of the opponent. The first shido leads to a Koka for one's opponent, the second one replaces this Koka with a Yuko, and so on (see Table 1 ). It is then obvious that, when a fighter picks up four shido, he immediately loses the fight since the four penalties sum up to an Ippon for his opponent. Grave infringements are punished with the penalty of
Hansoku-make, which results in direct defeat as well as disqualification from the entire tournament. Actions that are dangerous for the opponent or the athlete himself are classified as grave infringements. Table 1 ). Since we will interpret shido as sabotage, the free warning is seen as equivalent to one opportunity for a costless act of sabotage, which we will exploit when we analyze individual behavior in section 3.2.
The shido as an act of sabotage
As already mentioned above, the shido is a penalty given for an infringement of the rules of Judo. We believe that the shido should be seen as an act of sabotage. Based on the definition of Lazear (1989) , sabotage in a competition refers to "any (costly) actions that one worker takes that adversely affect the output of another" (p. 563). In the context of a Judo fight, the shido is the result of a -typically costly -action taken by one Judoka in order to adversely affect the opponent's productive effort, which in this case is his positive technical score. For example, a shido is given when a fighter "kicks the hand or arm of the opponent to make him release his grip", "bends back the opponent's finger in order to bend his grip", "adopts an excessively defensive posture", takes various actions that "prevent action in the contest", shows "non-combativity", "holds the opponent's sleeve end(s) for a defensive purpose", goes 7 outside of the contest area, etc.
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These actions are clearly aimed at illegitimately hindering the opponent's attack, thereby reducing the opponent's chances at improving his output through a positive technical score, without contributing anything to one's own technical score. In section 3.2 we will examine how the change in the cost of the first shido since 2009 has affected the likelihood of shido. Our hypothesis is that a cost reduction will lead to more shido.
Another feature of sabotage is that, by reducing the opponent's productive output, it aims at increasing one's chances of winning a competition. A shido can be interpreted in this way, as it may prevent a direct defeat through Ippon. Notice that, as long as the fight is continuing, it is always possible for the fighter lagging behind in terms of technical scores to win the match, even in its last second, if he manages to score an Ippon. This is due to the lexicographic winning rule. In that sense, a shido allows a fighter to stay in the game by avoiding a knock-out move by his opponent, and therefore can be seen as an effort to increase one's chances of winning. In section 3.3 we will analyze how a fighter's and his opponent's ability are related to the use of shido, thus examining in particular at whom sabotage is targeted. Our hypothesis is that shido should be more often employed by less qualified and more often targeted at more qualified subjects.
One last important feature that must be taken into account when drawing the parallel between sabotage in Judo and sabotage in organizations is the effect of sabotage on welfare.
In section 3.4 we will use the occurrence of positive scores resulting from legitimate attacking techniques as a proxy for spectator welfare, and we will show that shido are indeed welfare reducing. and including in its third column also the total figures. The first six rows refer to the score that was pivotal for determining the winner, i.e., the score that made the difference between the two fighters.
Results

Structure of the dataset and summary statistics
While we see that the majority of fights ended abruptly with an Ippon (about 60%), a sizeable share of about 33% of fights was decided based on the score after the five minutes of regular contest time. About 7% of fights were tied after five minutes and thus decided by golden score.
Table 2 about here
For each score, we have data on whether it was the result of a fighter's own (positive) effort or the result of one or more shido given to the opponent. This allows us to identify those fights in which shido was pivotal for the outcome, in the sense that the decisive difference in the final scoreline between the two opponents was the result of a shido. The sixth row of Table 2 shows that these fights account for approximately 13% of the total number of fights. 5 We also exclude fights in which one of the two contestants either did not turn up or forfeited due to injury. 6 Note that before 2009, all losers to the four semi-finalists were allowed into the repêchage, while since 2009 only the losers in the quarter-finals were admitted to the repêchage. As a consequence, there have been fewer fights in the repêchage since 2009. This is one of the reasons why we have fewer observations from 2009 than from 2007 in our dataset. We have examined the robustness of our results if we apply the repêchage-rules since 2009 to the 2007-data and have found qualitatively the exact same results. These robustness checks are available upon request.
Consequences of changing the cost of shido in 2009
Since 2009, every fighter has the opportunity for one costless shido. In other words, the marginal cost of the first shido is zero, but from the second shido onwards the marginal as well as total cost is the same as under the old rules. Hence, if fighters react to the rule change, we should observe fewer cases where a fighter commits no shido at all. As Figure 1 shows, Hence, our data strongly support the finding that the natural experiment of making the first shido costless since 2009 has led to more shido and to an earlier use of them.
Sabotage and competitors' qualification
Next we are going to examine how the use of sabotage is related to the competitors' qualification and other characteristics. In order to create a measure of the Judokas' qualification or competence, we reconstructed every fighter's position in the world ranking list at the time when a tournament took place (i.e., in 2007 or 2009). The world ranking list is based on each fighter's four best results during the most recent two-year period, with points allocated on the basis of performance in a tournament, adjusted for the importance of the tournament. Using this ranking, we then created a normalized measure of an athlete's ability within the weight class that he or she is competing in a given competition. This variable, called ability, is 0 for the lowest-ranked athlete in a weight class and 1 for the highest-ranked athlete.
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Looking at the correlations between ability and the number of shido, we document that the latter is increasing in the opponent's ability (correlation between opponent's ability and own number of shido: ρ = 0.15, p = 0.000). This result suggests that sabotage is more likely to be targeted at the more competent individuals in a tournament. At the same time, we find a negative correlation between own ability and number of shido, which implies that sabotage is more likely to come from less competent individuals, all else equal (ρ = -0.04, p = 0.039).
The two ordered probit regressions in Table 3 Table 1 ). 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined how the individual use of sabotage responds to changes in its cost structure. While previous experimental and field studies from soccer have examined how the prize for winning a contest affects sabotage activities del Corral et al., 2010) , the cost side and its influence on the incidence of sabotage has not received attention yet. Hence, we consider our paper as the first one presenting field evidence on the interplay between the cost and the extent of sabotage. From a survey among spectators we have reasons to believe that fewer positive and more negative scores are welfare reducing from the viewpoint of spectators. Hence, the rule change by the International Judo Federation has not only changed the characteristics of fights (more and quicker shido; fewer positive scores), but arguably also the perception and well-being of spectators. Therefore it seems well justified to summarize that the change in the cost of sabotage has had a profound impact on the tournament.
We have also found that sabotage activities are significantly more often targeted at more qualified agents, measured by means of a Judoka's world ranking, and they are less often used by better Judokas. This is certainly an intuitive finding. However, it is exactly the type of finding that worries organizations around the globe, namely that destructive activities will negatively affect the best performers, something that can bear high costs for the profits of a company, or -in a different context -for the quality of candidates in electoral campaigns.
Our field study has provided strong evidence that these worries may be well justified.
Moreover, we have shown that the worries will be exacerbated if the costs of sabotage are reduced, since agents react systematically to incentives, such as a change in sabotage costs.
For this reason, internal control mechanisms in companies that try to monitor and discourage sabotage are very important to prevent losses in productivity that may arise if the output of the most productive members of an organization is targeted by counterproductive activities. (1) 
